Integrity
Checks committed bytes and bundle bindings
CLAIMS / BOUNDARIES
Inspect the boundary of every claim before extending the product to payments, agents or industrial use.
Checks committed bytes and bundle bindings
May inspect a signature under an explicit trust configuration
Requires independently grounded source attribution
Requires rule and input validity tests
Requires a trusted independent time source
Requires an actual release gate and witness
EVIDENCE LENS / TAP TO EXAMINE
Every statement has a source, a bounded witness, and something it cannot establish. This is a read-only navigation layer—not a live integrity test.
The transferred bundle can be inspected for defined integrity and binding checks without a producer application session.
The files must actually be present in a transferred bundle; this statement is about named verifier checks.
The standalone verifier documents checks on committed artifacts, receipts, ledgers, and optional issuer authentication.
Does not establish external source truth, universally trusted time, replay, or actual payment release.
Registered adapters submit to the Kernel; they may not originate another verdict, receipt, or bundle identity.
This restriction has bounded CI witnesses for registered adapters—not a guarantee about every external system.
The repository boundary document describes its registered-adapter gate and forbids local decision, receipt, and bundle origins.
Does not cover arbitrary off-repository adapters or prove a bank's authorization.
A CVE Pack declares policy and test inputs, including an illustrative critical CVE expected to produce DENY.
The test definition does not prove a live scanner, production deployment, or independent release authority.
The critical-cve-blocker pack defines an integer CVSS threshold; its cases include an example score of 98/10 and expected DENY.
Expected YAML assertions are not a witnessed live scan or production receipt.